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Michael Caie ∗
In Benardete [1964], Jose´ Benardete presents the following puzzling scenario:
A man decides to walk one mile from A to B. A god waits in readiness to throw
up a wall blocking the man’s further advance when the man has travelled 1/2
mile. A second god (unbeknownst to the first) waits in readiness to throw up a
wall of his own blocking the man’s further advance when the man has travelled
1/4 mile. A third god ... etc. ad infinitum. It is clear that this infinite sequence
of mere intentions (assuming the contrary-to-fact conditional that each god would
succeed in executing his intentions if given the opportunity) logically entails the
consequence that the man will be arrested at point A; he will not be able to pass
beyond it, even though not a single wall will in fact be thrown down in his path.
The ... [effect] will be described by the man as a strange field of force blocking
has passage forward. 1
This puzzling case has been discussed by a few authors.2 I think, however, that there is
still a paradox lurking in this scenario that has not been clearly isolated. In this note, I will
outline this paradox and suggest some lessons that may be drawn from it.
1 The Paradox
It will help if we describe the scenario that Benardete outlines in a bit more detail, and if
we also engage in some selective redescription and relabeling.
Let us imagine a two-dimensional world with the metric structure of the Eu-
clidean plane. We assume that a creature—call it M—is able to move along a
line within this plane, and that it must do so in a continuous manner. Given
a metric preserving mapping from the points of this line onto the real numbers,
we associate each point with the corresponding real number. We assume that
M begins at some point s < 0 and moves toward 0. For each n ∈ N, and each
point 1
n
, there is a god at that point who intends to throw up an impenetrable
∗University of Pittsburgh / caiemike@gmail.com / Thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, Cian Dorr and Paolo
Santorio for helpful discussion related to this paper.
1Emphasis added.
2See, for example, Priest [1999], Yablo [2000], Hawthorne [2000] and Uzquiano [2012].
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(one-dimensional) wall at 1
n
, if M makes it past 1
n+1
. Were such a wall to be
thrown up at 1
n
, M would not make it past this point. We assume, further, that
there are no walls at any point z ≤ 0 and, finally, that M ’s progress will remain
unimpeded unless there is a wall to stop it.
It will help to have some definitional abbreviations on hand.
Def. Let Pz =df M has passed z, i.e., has made it to a point q > z.
Def. Let Wz =df there is an impenetrable wall at point z.3
The first thing to note is that, given the description of the case, it would seem that if M
were to make it past 1
n+1
, then the god at 1
n
would throw up a wall at 1
n
, and M would not
make it past 1
n
. That is, given the description of the case, it would seem that we have each
instance of the following counterfactual schema:
Intention Realizationn: P 1
n+1
 (W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
)
And so, given the description of the case, it would seem that we have the following infinite
conjunction:
Intention Realization:
∧
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
 (W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
)]
But, given the description of the case, we also have4:
Only Walls: ∀y[(¬∃x≤yWx)→ Py]
No Walls: ¬∃x≤0Wx
The problem, though, is that, given very minimal assumptions about the logic of counter-
factuals, we have that Intention Realization, Only Walls, and No Walls are jointly inconsistent.
While, then, it would seem like we can describe a coherent situation in which all of these
claims hold, this turns out to be false.
Claim: Intention Realization, Only Walls, and No Walls are jointly inconsistent.
Justification: We first show that, given Intention Realization, we have ¬P 1
n
, for
each n ∈ N. Assume, then, for arbitrary n ∈ N, that P 1
n
. Then, since if M
has passed 1
n
, M has also passed 1
n+1
, we have P 1
n+1
. Given Intention Realization,
though, and the minimal assumption that the inference from φ ψ and φ to
ψ is valid, it follows from P 1
n+1
that we have ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
. And so, in particular,
3Strictly speaking, of course, both of these should be time-indexed. However, to avoid distracting clutter,
we’ll leave it to context to determine the appropriate time parameter.
4Here ‘→’ should be read as the material conditional.
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we have ¬P 1
n
, which, together with P 1
n
, gives us a contradiction. By reductio,
then, we have ¬P 1
n
. And, since n was arbitrary, it follows that we have, for each
n ∈ N, ¬P 1
n
.
Given Only Walls and No Walls, however, it follows that, for some n ∈ N, P 1
n
.
For Only Walls and No Walls together entail P0. But, of course, if M makes it to
some point z > 0, then it follows that there is some n ∈ N, such that M makes
it to some point z > 1
n
.
And so we have that, for some n ∈ N, P 1
n
, which together with the claim that,
for each n ∈ N, ¬P 1
n
, gives us a contradiction.
Consider now the following two claims:
Intention Realization Possibility: There is some metaphysically possible sce-
nario in which Intention Realization holds.
Conditional Compossibility: If Intention Realization is metaphysically possible,
then it is metaphysically compossible with Only Walls and No Walls.
Both of these claim are, I think, at least prima facie plausible.
On the one hand, Intention Realization Possibility is prima facie plausible. For it certainly
seems like, in the scenario described, each god should be able to realize their intention were
they called upon to do so. To drive this home we could flesh out the situation in greater
detail. We might, for example, imagine that when such gods are not arranged in such a
sequence they are able to call up such a wall at will. Why, then, would they not all be able
to realize their intentions, were they called upon to do so, given that they are arranged as
described? At first glance, at least, it isn’t obvious what a good answer to this question
would be.
On the other hand, Conditional Compossibility is also prima facie plausible. For the facts
that would seem to ensure that Intention Realization holds, namely the facts about the gods’
intentions to throw up walls at various points past 0, were M to make it past other points
beyond 0, and their general efficaciousness, wouldn’t seem to be the sorts of facts that
constrain what might happen to M at points prior to and including 0.
However, despite the fact that both Intention Realization Possibility and Conditional Com-
possibility are prima facie plausible, the preceding shows that one of these claims must be
rejected. Either Intention Realization isn’t metaphysically possible, or it is metaphysically
possible but the situations in which Intention Realization hold are all such that either Only
Walls or No Walls fail.5
5It would take us too far afield to consider in detail how this paradox relates to those versions already
formulated in the literature. The key difference, however, is that other discussions of Benardete’s scenario
don’t formulate the paradox that it is supposed to generate in terms of counterfactuals. Thus, Priest [1999]
and Yablo [2000] consider a paradox formulated in terms of material conditionals, while Hawthorne [2000]
considers one formulated in terms of causal laws. These paradoxes are certainly all interesting in their own
right. However, I think that the paradox isolated here raises interesting issues that don’t arise in these other
versions that do not explicitly involve counterfactuals. And, for what it’s worth, given the explicit appeal
to counterfactuals in the presentation of this puzzling scenario, it seems natural to consider whether there
might be a paradox generated by this scenario that explicitly involves counterfactual claims.
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2 Rejecting Conditional Compossibility.
Let’s first consider the option of endorsing Intention Realization Possibility and rejecting Con-
ditional Compossibility. According to this view, at least in some worlds in which something
impedes M ’s progress before it reaches 0, each of the gods is such that it would realize its
intention to block M by throwing up a wall, were it called upon to do so. This, indeed,
would seem to be the view endorsed by Benardete.
We can distinguish two views within this camp.
On the one hand, one might maintain that the sorts of facts that would seem to support
Intention Realization—namely the gods’ intentions and the individual facts about them that
ensure that they are typically able to realize their intentions to create walls—suffice to ensure
that Intention Realization holds, as long as something impedes M ’s progress at or before 0.6
On the other hand, one might deny that every case in which the gods have the appropriate
intensions etc. and in which M ’s progress is halted is one in which Intention Realization holds.
Instead, one might maintain that Intention Realization will hold, if, but only if, in addition
to the gods’ intentions etc. it is a causal law that such intentions etc. serve to prevent M ’s
passage beyond 0.7
Now I don’t think that either of these views is incoherent. Both, however, have the
surprising consequence that while the intentions of the gods and their general efficacy do not
ensure that Intention Realization holds, these facts, in conjunction with some other facts that,
at least initially might seem to be irrelevant to the counterfactuals that are the conjuncts of
Intention Realization, do ensure that Intention Realization holds.
For example, at least initially, it is hard to see why, if the intentions of the gods and
their general efficacy do not themselves suffice to ensure that Intention Realization holds,
the addition of some impediments, causally unconnected to the intentions of the gods, that
arise at or before 0 should, together with those intentions, suffice to ensure that Intention
Realization holds. For Intention Realization concerns what would happen at various points
beyond 0, were M to make it to other points beyond 0.
And, at least initially, it is also hard to see why, if the intentions of the gods and their
general efficacy do not themselves suffice to ensure that Intention Realization holds, the addi-
tion of causal laws that dictate that the gods’ intentions to throw up walls at various points
after 0 causally suffice to ensure that some event stops M at or before 0 should, together
with those intentions, suffice to ensure that Intention Realization holds. For, at least initially,
what would seem to make the intentions of the gods and their general efficacy suffice to en-
sure that Intention Realization holds is simply the potential causal connection between such
intentions and walls that might be built at various points after 0.
Each of the above views, though, would have us reject one of these initially plausible
thoughts. Now perhaps the lesson to draw from this paradox is that we should reject one
of these plausible thoughts. I’m inclined to think, though, that the plausibility of the claim
6Although he does not frame the puzzle raised by Benardete’s scenario in terms of counterfactuals, one
can perhaps see something akin to this sort of view in Yablo [2000].
7Although he also does not frame the puzzle raised by Benardete’s scenario in terms of counterfactuals,
one can perhaps see something akin to this sort of view in Hawthorne [2000].
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that whether Intention Realization holds, given the intentions of the gods etc., should be
independent of whether there is anything that stops M at or before 0, gives us good reason to
think that the lesson to draw from this paradox is that, despite appearances, the intentions
of the gods and their general efficacy couldn’t suffice to ensure that Intention Realization
holds, even in conjunction with other facts concerning what happens to M at or before 0.
Furthermore, I think that there are general principled grounds for maintaining this.
3 Rejecting Intention Realization Possibility
Let’s now consider the option of rejecting Intention Realization Possibility. To see why there
are principled grounds for rejecting this claim, despite its prima facie plausibility, consider
the following:
Intention Failure:
∨
n∈N
P 1
n+1

∨
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
∧ ¬(W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
)]
This says, roughly, that if M were to make it some distance past 0, then, for some n ∈ N,
M would make it past 1
n+1
and it would not be the case that the god at 1
n
would throw up
a wall at 1
n
and M would not make it past 1
n
.
Claim: Intention Failure holds at every possible world.
Justification: To see why this holds, note that Intention Failure follows from:8
(∗) ∨
n∈N
P 1
n+1

∨
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
∧ ∃z≤nP 1
z
]
But (∗) is guaranteed to hold at any possible world. For, given any n + 1, if M
has made it past 1
n+1
, there is some m > n, such that M has made it past 1
m+1
and also past 1
z
, for some z ≤ m. Since, then, Intention Failure follows from (∗),
it follows that Intention Failure holds at every possible world.
8Justification: Note first that:∨
n∈N
P 1
n+1

∨
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
∧ ¬(W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
)]
is equivalent to: ∨
n∈N
P 1
n+1

∨
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
∧ (¬W 1
n
∨ ∃z≤nP 1
z
)].
And the latter clearly follows from:∨
n∈N
P 1
n+1

∨
n∈N
[P 1
n+1
∧ ∃z≤nP 1
z
].
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Next consider the following:9
Possible Passage:
∧
n∈N
♦P 1
n+1
Claim: Possible Passage holds at every possible world.
Justification: Even if, for each n ∈ N, it is impossible, given the constraints
imposed on the putative possible world described by Benardete’s scenario, for
M to make it past 1
n+1
, we surely shouldn’t maintain that it is metaphysically
impossible for M to make it past 1
n+1
. For, of course, there are plenty of possible
worlds in which M travels along the appropriate line and these constraints are
absent. For each n ∈ N, then, there should be some possible world in which
M makes it past 1
n+1
. Thus, for any possible world, and each n ∈ N, it will be
metaphysically possible for M to make it past 1
n+1
. And so, at each possible
world, Possible Passage will hold.
Now, at a certain level of abstraction, we can see Intention Realization, Intention Failure,
and Possible Passage as having the following logical forms:
(ILF1):
∧
n∈N
(φn ψn)
(ILF2):
∨
n∈N
φn
∨
n∈N
(φn ∧ ¬ψn)
(ILF3):
∧
n∈N
♦φn
There are, however, good grounds, I think, for maintaining that any three claims of the
form (ILF1) − (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent. Assuming that this is so, it follows that
we have good grounds for rejecting Intention Realization Possibility. For, if any claims of
the form (ILF1) − (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent, then it follows that Intention Realization,
Intention Failure, and Possible Passage are jointly inconsistent. However, we’ve argued that
both Intention Failure and Possible Passage hold at every possible world. Given this, though, it
follows that, if, given the logic of counterfactuals, Intention Realization, Intention Failure, and
Possible Passage are inconsistent, then Intention Realization will fail to hold at any possible
world, and so we must reject Intention Realization Possibility.
To see why it’s plausible that a reasonable logic for counterfactuals will tell us that any
three claims of the form (ILF1), (ILF2), and (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent, consider, first,
the following set of schemas:
9I’ll understand ♦φ to mean that φ is metaphysically possible. In what follows, I’ll assume that metaphys-
ical possibilities do not lead to absurdity given counterfactual supposition. Thus, if we have ♦φ, then it isn’t
the case that, for some ψ, φ ψ and φ ¬ψ both hold. This fact will be tacitly appealed to at various
points in what follows, for example at certain points in which it is shown that claims that have the logical
form of Intention Realization, Intention Failure, and Possible Passage are inconsistent given certain semantic
treatments of the counterfactual. If one is skeptical of the general claim that metaphysical possibilities do
not lead to absurdity given counterfactual supposition, then simply substitute for Possible Passage the claim
that, for each n ∈ N, P 1
n+1
is coherently counterfactually supposible. This seems to me obvious, and, given
this alternative assumption, the arguments can proceed mutatis mutandis.
6
(1) φ ψ
(2) χ ξ
(3) (φ ∨ χ) (φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (χ ∧ ¬ξ)
(4) ♦φ ∧ ♦ψ
Now, I think that intuitively claims of the form (1) − (4) are inconsistent. For, given
(3), it would seem that we should conclude that either things would not be as (1) claims
they would be were φ to be the case, or things would not be as (2) claims they would be
were χ to be the case. But, then, (1), (2) and (3) should be inconsistent, at least given
the further assumption, provided by (4), that φ and ψ are possible and so are coherently
counterfactually supposible.
To see this, it will perhaps help to consider a particular instantiation of these schemas.
Imagine, then, that Joshua and Aparna are playing a quiz game with some friends and are
both asked a question. Now consider the following set of claims:
(1∗) If Joshua were to answer, he’d get it right.
(2∗) If Aparna were to answer, she’d get it right.
(3∗) If either were to answer, at least one would get it wrong.
(4∗) For both Joshua and Aparna, it is metaphysically possible for them to an-
swer.
Now, (4∗) obviously holds. So, with this in the background, focus on (1∗) − (3∗). To
my ear, at least, these sound obviously contradictory. If both would get the answer right,
were they to answer, then if either were to answer, it seems clear that neither would get the
answer wrong. But, given (4∗), this should contradict (3∗).
The intuition that claims of the form (1)− (4) are inconsistent should, I think, generalize
quite naturally. Thus, the same sorts of considerations that motivate the claim that (1)−(4)
are inconsistent should motivate the claim that counterfactuals of the following form are
inconsistent:
(FLF1):
∧
n∈{1,2,...m}
(φn ψn)
(FLF2):
∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
φn
∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
(φn ∧ ¬ψn)
(FLF3):
∧
n∈{1,2,...m}
♦φn
For, given (FLF2), it would seem that we should conclude that for some n ∈ {1, 2, ...m}
things would not be as the particular conjunct of (FLF1) claims they would be were φn to
be the case. And so, given (FLF3), it would seem that (FLF1) and (FLF2) are inconsistent.
The intuition that claims of the form (FLF1) − (FLF3) are inconsistent is, furthermore,
supported by some principled semantic theories of counterfactuals.10
10See Stalnaker [1968] and Lewis [1973].
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Claim: (FLF1) − (FLF3) are jointly inconsistent given Stalnaker’s semantics for
counterfactuals and given Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals.
Justification: We can think of Stalnaker’s semantics for counterfactuals as the
result of taking Lewis’ semantics and imposing a restriction on the class of models.
If, then, a set of claims is inconsistent given Lewis’ semantics, it follows that it
is also inconsistent given Stalnaker’s semantics. We can focus, then, on Lewis’s
semantics.
According to Lewis’ semantics, given a world w, there is a total pre-order on
worlds ≤w, such that, if φ is true at some world, then φ ψ is true at w just in
case there is some w′ such that φ holds at w′ and φ → ψ holds at each w′′ such
that w′′ ≤w w′.
Let w, then, be an arbitrary world and assume that (FLF1) − (FLF3) all hold
at w. Given Lewis’ semantics, it follows from (FLF1) and (FLF3) that: (i) for
each n ∈ {1, 2, ...m}, there is some wn such that φn holds at wn and φn → ψn
holds for each w′′ such that w′′ ≤w wn. And it follows from (FLF2) and (FLF3)
that: (ii) there is some w′ such that
∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
φn holds at w
′ and
∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
φn →∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
(φn ∧ ¬ψn) holds for each w′′ such that w′′ ≤ w′. But, given (i) and
(ii), it follows that there is some w′ such that: (a) for some n ∈ {1, 2, ...m},
φn holds at w
′, (b) for each n ∈ {1, 2, ...m}, φn → ψn holds at w′, and (c)∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
φn →
∨
n∈{1,2,...m}
(φn ∧ ¬ψn) holds at w′.
But no world that can satisfy conditions (a) − (c). Thus (FLF1) − (FLF3)
cannot hold at w.
Now (ILF1) − (ILF3) are simply the respective infinite generalizations of (FLF1) −
(FLF3). And it seems to me that the same sorts of grounds that were adduced in support
of the claim that instances of (FLF1) − (FLF3) are inconsistent may be adduced in support
of the claim that instances of (ILF1) − (ILF3) are inconsistent. Thus just as it would seem
that, given (FLF2), for some n ∈ {1, 2, ...m}, things would not be as the particular conjunct
of (FLF1) claims they would be were φn to be the case, so too does it seem that, given
(ILF2), for some n ∈ N, things would not be as the particular conjunct of (ILF1) claims
they would be were φn to be the case.
Moreover, there are principled semantic theories of counterfactuals that entail the incon-
sistency of (ILF1) − (ILF3).
Claim: (ILF1) − (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent given Stalnaker’s semantics for
counterfactuals and given Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals together with the
Limit Assumption.
Justification: If a set of claims are inconsistent given Lewis’s semantics for
counterfactuals together with the Limit Assumption, then they will also be in-
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consistent given Stalnaker’s semantics. We can focus, then, on Lewis’s semantics
with the Limit Assumption.
The Limit Assumption tells us that, if φ holds at some world, then, for any world
w, there will be some world w′, at which φ holds, such that there is no w′′ at
which φ holds, such that w′′ ≤w w′ while w′ 6≤w w′′. That is, there will be a set
of minimal φ permitting worlds given the pre-order ≤w.
Let w, then, be an arbitrary world and let us assume that (ILF1) − (ILF3) hold
at w. Given (ILF3) and the Limit Assumption, there will be a set of ≤w minimal
worlds at which
∨
n∈N
φn holds. Let this set be C. Given (ILF2), we have that
every w′ ∈ C is such that that ∨
n∈N
(φn ∧ ¬ψn) holds at w′. Pick an arbitrary
w′ ∈ C and let m be such that φm ∧ ¬ψm holds at w′. Then it follows that
φm ψm cannot hold at w. For w′ will be amongst the ≤w minimal worlds at
which φm holds. But in order for φm ψm to hold at w, ψm must hold at all
such worlds. It follows, then, that (ILF1) does not hold at w, which contradicts
our assumption that (ILF1) − (ILF3) hold at w.
There seems to me, then, good reason to say that claims of the form (ILF1) − (ILF3) are
jointly inconsistent. Intuitively they would seem to be, and this intuition can be supported
by principled semantic theories.
As we’ve seen, though, given that (ILF1) − (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent, there is a sim-
ple resolution to the paradox raised Benardete’s scenario. For, given the joint inconsistency
of (ILF1) − (ILF3), we must reject Intention Realization Possibility. Despite appearances,
there simply is no possible world in which each of the gods is such that it would realize its
intention were it called upon to do so. This is ruled out on principled logical grounds.
Indeed, in light of the plausibility of Conditional Compossibility, I’m inclined to see the
paradox raised by Benardete’s scenario as providing additional support for the claim that
(ILF1) − (ILF3) are jointly inconsistent. For given this inconsistency, we have a simple
resolution of the paradox, while without this principle it is hard to see how we can avoid
rejecting the otherwise plausible principle Conditional Compossibility.
In closing, let me note one way in which the preceding may be brought to bear on a
contested issue concerning the logic and semantics of counterfactuals. One principle that
separates Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals and Stalnaker’s is the Limit Assumption. Stal-
naker accepts this principle, while Lewis rejects it. We’ve seen though that if you add the
Limit Assumption to Lewis’ semantics, then claims of the form (ILF1) − (ILF3) come out
jointly inconsistent. It turns out, though, that if you give up the Limit Assumption such
claims need not be inconsistent. Indeed, we can show the following.
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Claim: Intention Realization, Intention Failure, and Possible Passage are logically
consistent, given Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals without the Limit As-
sumption.
Justification: Here’s a model in which these three claims all come out true
given Lewis’ semantics. We have a world w and, for each n ∈ N, a world wn.
We assume that, for each n,m ∈ N, if m > n, then wm ≤w wn and wn 6≤w wm.
We further assume that, for each n ∈ N, P 1
n+1
and (W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
) hold at wn,
while for each m > n, P 1
m
and ¬(W 1
n
∧ ∀z≤n¬P 1
z
) also hold at wn.
If, then, one endorses Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals and rejects the Limit Assump-
tion, it follows that one can’t resolve the paradox raised by Benardete’s scenario by claiming
that, on logical grounds, Intention Realization must fail to hold. Now there are some well-
known counterintuitive consequences of combining Lewis’ semantics with a rejection of the
Limit Assumption.11 I suggest that Benardete’s scenario can be seen as highlighting another
such implausible consequence. It is, at the very least, a point in favor of accepting the Limit
Assumption that, in doing so, one can provide a simple and principled resolution to the
paradox raised by Benardete’s scenario that is not available if one rejects this principle.
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